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Historians have tended to equate success with winning battles, 
failure with defeat, and yet there 
is much more to being successful 
in senior appointments than just 
battlefield victory. Success seems to 
call for a trilogy of abilities: the ability 
to defend national interests in the 
highest military (and often political) 
circles; the ability to organize and 
manage forces both before and 
during combat; and the ability to 
lead both directly and indirectly 
those who have to implement the 
plans. Are we right to apply this 
three-pillared standard? This article 
attempts to answer that question 
by reviewing the performance of 
the three generals who commanded 
First Canadian Army during the 
Second World War: Generals A.G.L. 
McNaughton and H.D.G. Crerar, and 
Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds.1 
While the junior man of the group 
– Guy Simonds – appeared from 
the historical record to be the most 
successful and best regarded, what 
criteria have been used in these 
determinations?
 It is worthwhile to consider 
the thoughts of three distinguished 
thinkers (two of them practitioners): 
Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell, 
historian Martin van Creveld, and 
Guy Simonds. In the 1939 Lees 
Knowles Lectures Wavell focussed 
on three aspects of generalship: 
personal qualities; subordinates; 
and political masters. But he also 
quoted from Socrates who had said 
that “the general must know how 
to get his men their rations and 
every other kind of stores needed 
for war.”2 Wavell felt that effective 
administration – providing for an 
army’s needs – was the “real crux of 
generalship.”3 Nonetheless, generals 
also needed a range of personal 
attributes: mental and physical 
robustness, physical courage, health 
and youth, courage of convictions, 
knowledge of humanity and fighting 
spirit.4 These were necessary to “keep 
strict, though not necessarily stern 
discipline,…[and give ungrudging] 
praise where praise is due,” be visible 
to the troops, avoid sarcasm and keep 
the soldiers informed.5 These things, 
he said, were hard to do given that 
generals were far less visible to their 
soldiers than in times past. Finally, 
Wavell reminded his audience that 
the general and the politician worked 
in unique yet overlapping spheres 
and that cooperation was of vital 
importance for the successful conduct 
of the war.6 Wavell painted a picture 
of a complex and demanding range 
of competencies.
 In February 1944 Guy Simonds, 
shortly after assuming command 
of 2 Canadian Corps, prepared a 
summary of what he saw as the 
“Essential Qualities in the Leader.”7 
All were necessary for success. 
Some, such as knowledge, physical 
fitness and weapons skills, could be 
learned or “acquired” while others 
were “inherent.” Among the latter 
were “moral” qualities including 
“resolution” and “determination”: 
“A man who originates good ideas 
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and intentions but who 
is unable to get them 
put into practice may be 
useful in a pure research 
o r  i n  a n  a d v i s o r y 
capacity, but is quite 
useless in any executive 
command.”8 In addition 
t o  u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
warfighting doctrine 
a commander “must 
know how to command 
– how to delegate to his 
subordinates and his 
staff, how to control, 
how to position himself 
o n  t h e  b a t t l e f i e l d 
and make use of his 
communications, and, 
m o s t  i m p o r t a n t l y 
of all, he must have 
an understanding of 
human nature  and 
how to ‘get at’ men.”9 
Simonds’ successful 
c o m m a n d e r  t h u s 
seemed to be someone 
who could use his 
knowledge of warfare 
t o  c o m e  u p  w i t h 
appropriate solutions 
to problems and then 
use the people around 
him to turn these ideas 
into effective results.
 Historian Martin 
van Creveld wrote in 
Command in War that “First, command 
must  arrange and coordinate 
everything an army needs to exist… 
Second, command enables the army 
to carry out its proper mission [– the 
efficient destruction of the enemy 
force].”10 Van Creveld believed that 
history is not like social science and 
that there should be no reluctance to 
look at specifics rather than broad 
trends: “a study of command cannot 
avoid asking the down to earth 
questions: who ordered whom to do 
what, when, by what means, on the 
basis of what information, what for, 
and to what ends.”11 Conversely, he 
says, the challenge is to find answers 
to these questions without resorting 
to a few examples as this sampling 
can “distort reality.” To study 
command and commanders is not 
an easy undertaking he concludes. 
“To make the task manageable, it is 
necessary to limit the analysis to the 
purely military side of things.”12 
 Synthesizing these models, 
it seems that commanders must, 
implicitly or explicitly, demonstrate 
a considerable and well developed 
intellect which permits them to deal 
with complex situations. They must 
also be able to lead their subordinates, 
instilling confidence 
and providing guidance 
and direct ion,  and 
be managers of large 
and multidimensional 
organizations. They 
must have a mastery 
o f  the  na ture  and 
functions of military 
organizations and of 
warfighting, and when 
needed of the interface 
between military and 
political controls.
 During the war there 
was one other criterion 
which was used to 
assess Canadian and all 
Commonwealth senior 
commanders and that 
was the British penchant 
for experience. It was 
seen by the British as 
somewhere between 
odd and unacceptable 
t o  a p p o i n t  s e n i o r 
commanders who had 
not experienced combat 
a n d  c o m m a n d e d 
at lower levels. For 
Canadians, who had 
lived in peace for two 
decades this was a hard 
hurdle to get over.
 W h e n  “ A n d y ” 
M c N a u g h t o n  w a s 
appointed  genera l 
officer commanding-in-chief (GOC-
in-C) of First Canadian Army on 6 
April 1942 it marked the culmination 
of almost three decades of military 
service to Canada. After a stint 
as head of the National Research 
Council in the late 1930s McNaughton 
returned to uniformed service in 1939 
first as GOC of 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division and then as commander of 1st 
Canadian Corps. Serving in England 
McNaughton was responsible for 
both training the growing Canadian 
army and for representing the needs 
and interests of the army to Canadian 
politicians and British leaders. When 
Lieutenant-General Andrew McNaughton was the first to command First 
Canadian Army. He was found wanting in a number of areas and replaced 
in 1943.
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he was relieved of command of 
First Canadian Army at the end 
of 1943 there were two principal 
reasons: his disagreement with the 
Canadian government over the 
splitting of the Army, which would 
allow 1 Canadian Corps to gain 
battle experience in Italy while at the 
same time demonstrating Canada’s 
resolve in the conduct of the war, and 
his miscues as the head of an army 
sized formation during a major field 
exercise in England earlier that year. 
 McNaughton did not seem able 
or willing during 1943 to accept 
Ottawa’s decision that it was in 
Canada’s best interests to send a 
corps to the Mediterranean theatre. 
Rather, the nationalistic general saw 
the splitting of the Canadian army 
as blow to Canadian prestige. This 
situation, and other disagreements 
with political leaders and bureaucrats, 
suggest that McNaughton could be 
prone to seeing things his own way 
regardless of what the government 
wanted.13 His actual falling out over 
the despatch of 1 Corps to Italy left 
him in clear opposition to confirmed 
government policy. He might have 
weathered these debates but for his 
ineffectiveness as commander of First 
Canadian Army. 
 McNaughton’s ability as a 
battlefield commander had been 
a concern since 1941. General Sir 
Alan Brooke, the British chief of the 
imperial general staff (CIGS) cast a 
critical eye on all senior commanders 
and was not afraid of culling those 
whom he thought incapable of 
their tasks.14 Brooke had started to 
question McNaughton’s effectiveness 
as early as April 1941 when he 
watched an exercise commanded 
by McNaughton: “Rather depressed 
at the standard of training and 
efficiency of the Canadian Divisional 
a n d  B r i g a d e  C o m m a n d e r s . ” 
“ U n f o r t u n a t e l y  a s  l o n g  a s 
MacNaughton [sic] commanded 
the Corps there is not much chance 
for improvement. He could not see 
the deficiency in training and was 
no judge of the qualities required 
of a Commander.”15 McNaughton’s 
training programme did not include 
subunit or unit training and as a 
result leaders at those levels had no 
chance to develop their skills in doing 
quick estimates and hasty attacks. 16 
McNaughton “lacked the required 
qualities of command.”17 
 McNaughton’s first and only 
experience where he actual ly 
commanded First Canadian Army in 
the field took place in 1943. Exercise 
Spartan has been well documented 
and allows us to look specifically at 
McNaughton’s personal role during 
these large manoeuvres. Prior to the 
exercise he decided to include the 
fledgling 2 Canadian Corps in his 
three corps force even though it had 
never exercised even on its own. 
McNaughton’s biographer views 
this decision as well reasoned, the 
general feeling that the learning 
opportunities would more than offset 
any teething problems .18 Historian 
Jack English on the other hand calls 
the value of 2 Corps’ participation 
“questionable.”19
 During the exercise the real weak 
link turned out to be McNaughton 
himself. He has been criticized, 
particularly by English, for his 
decision and counter-decision to 
pass 2 Corps through the rear area of 
1 Corps; he seemed to have no sense 
of the possible catastrophe of such 
a manoeuvre. English also criticizes 
the general for being all too ready 
to become engrossed by technical 
details, citing McNaughton’s decision 
to visit bridging operations rather 
than remain focused on army level 
matters.20 
 The full extent of McNaughton’s 
difficulties as a commander are 
apparent in eyewitness accounts 
which cite periods of indecision, 
orders issued and rescinded, trips 
forward for insignificant reasons, and 
daily instructions transmitted so late 
that it was virtually impossible for 
subordinate formations to adequately 
prepare for the next day’s action.21 
Brooke was in McNaughton’s HQ, 
just as the Canadian was cancelling 
2 Corps’ move across 1 Corps’ rear.22 
After seeing McNaughton in action 
Brooke recorded: “He does not 
know how to begin to cope with the 
job and is tying his force up into the 
most awful muddle!” “I felt that I 
could not accept the responsibility 
of allowing the Canadian Army to 
go into action under his orders.” 
This level of detail is exactly the 
precision which historians should 
strive to find and use if we want 
to really begin to understand what 
commanders thought, said, and did 
as they attempted to command.
 Fate led to the political/military 
and operational challenges which 
confronted the general at virtually the 
same time.23 Always acknowledged 
as a popular leader McNaughton 
had nonetheless failed on at least two 
counts within our model. 
 A junior officer in the Great War, 
H.D.G. “Harry” Crerar remained 
in uniform becoming known as 
Canada’s pre-eminent interwar staff 
officer. Rising to CGS in the early war 
years he developed and subsequently 
gained government approval for the 
structure of the Canadian Army. In 
December 1941 he moved to England 
to command 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Division, taking command of 1 
Canadian Corps in April 1942. He 
took that corps to Italy at the end of 
1943 and then returned to England 
replacing McNaughton as Army 
commander. He commanded the 
Army during the entire campaign in 
North West Europe except for two 
periods of illness.
 Crerar had an ability to sense 
the  pol i t ical  direct ion of  the 
government and then factor with it 
the related military and international 
considerations.24 During his time as 
CGS he provided advice on three 
major issues: the implementation of 
the National Resources Mobilization 
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Act; the creation of a 
five division army in 
Britain along side a 
robust domestic defence 
force; and the decision 
to despatch troops to 
Hong Kong.25 In the 
latter circumstance 
Crerar had examined 
the defence of Imperial 
interests in the Pacific 
as part of his year at 
the Imperial Defence 
College in 1934 and 
subsequently stayed 
abreast of issues while 
director of military 
o p e r a t i o n s  a n d 
intelligence in Ottawa.26 
I n  1 9 4 1  h e  d i d  a 
detailed reassessment: 
he did not dismiss the 
risks, but based his 
advice on strategic 
level intell igence. 27 
Once the government 
accepted the request 
Crerar examined the 
tactical and technical 
aspects of the matter. 
Concluding it to be a 
relatively low risk task 
he approved the use of two battalions 
then doing garrison duty elsewhere, 
thus minimizing any impact on the 
raising of 4th Canadian Division 
which was going on at the same 
time.28 In hindsight Hong Kong 
was not a low risk situation, but 
the British and the Americans, both 
of whom had long experience in 
the region, were caught similarly 
unprepared by the “magnitude of 
Japanese irrationality.”29
 The other half of Crerar’s war 
involved his time as corps and army 
commander. Many criticisms have 
been heaped on his performance. 
Some have to do with his personality 
and others are related to the fact that 
like McNaughton he was caught 
between being a field commander and 
a national commander, something his 
British superiors and particularly 
Montgomery could not seem to 
accept.30 Crerar was as determined a 
nationalist as McNaughton, but that 
he used “a more balanced approach” 
ensuring that he maintained good 
relations while also exercising his 
prerogative a senior Canadian.31 
 Crerar got into two flaps early on 
as Army commander. On his first day 
in Normandy he became embroiled 
in an argument with his immediate 
subordinate Lieutenant-General J.T. 
Crocker of 1 British Corps. After 
Montgomery’s intercession they 
smoothed over the issue and got 
on well until Crocker’s corps left 
First Canadian Army the following 
March.32 Crerar fell afoul of Monty by 
later attending a Canadian ceremony 
at Dieppe, which conflicted with a 
conference called by 
Montgomery. While 
C.P. Stacey believes the 
conference was of little 
value, Montgomery 
could not accept that 
Crerar’s presence at 
D i e p p e  w i t h  2 n d 
Canadian  In fantry 
Division was of more 
i m p o r t a n c e  t o  t h e 
Canadian  nat iona l 
commander. Crerar 
refused to back down 
and threatened to take 
the matter to higher 
authori t ies .  To his 
credit, Montgomery 
sent a written apology.
 W h i l e  B r o o k e ’ s 
biographer indicates 
that the CIGS was happy 
to see Crerar, a friend 
and colleague since the 
First War, take over 
from McNaughton,33 
M o n t g o m e r y  w a s 
a p p a r e n t l y  m o r e 
cautious. Reporting to 
Brooke at the end of 
1943 he said: “The more 
I think of Harry Crerar 
the more I am convinced that he is 
quite unfit to command an army in 
the field at present…he wants a lot of 
teaching; I taught him about training; 
Oliver Leese [the Commander of 
Eighth Army in Italy at that time] 
will have to teach him the practical 
side of war.”34 At the end of July 1944 
Montgomery was again reporting to 
Brooke on Crerar’s progress, this time 
after the Crocker incident:
fighting his first battle and it is 
the first appearance in history 
of a Canadian Army H.Q. He is 
desperately anxious that it should 
succeed. He is so anxious that he 
worries himself all day!!
Montgomery’s biographer concludes 
that “Crerar’s naïveté about battle 
Lieutenant-General H.D.G. “Harry” Crerar succeeded McNaughton 
and led First Canadian Army until the end of the war.
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was something Monty felt he could 
cure…”35 We are left to assume that 
while Crerar was not a shining light 
he was not so bad that he needed 
replacing as had McNaughton.
 These comments were much 
different than those which Monty 
and others had made in 1942 and 
1943. Speaking of Crerar’s Beaver 
exercises run in early 1942 when 
he was replacing McNaughton 
as corps commander, the British 
general found them to be “logical 
and progressive.” During this same 
period Montgomery made the rounds 
of Canadian formations and units and 
produced his list of those who should 
be relieved. Crerar was given the task 
and got on with it.36 Shortly after, 
Montgomery recorded praise for 
Crerar at the end of the Canadian’s 
first test as a corps commander in 
Exercise Tiger in May 1942. “‘You 
did splendidly … when I say you 
did well I mean it.’” At the same time 
Monty did not report any issues to 
Brooke, a technique he used often 
when displeased with subordinates.37 
The next year, Brooke, Montgomery 
and Paget also noted Crerar’s abilities 
during exercise Spartan. Crerar’s 
personal development and training 
plan for the corps paid off, Brooke 
noted that “Crerar had ‘improved the 
corps out of all recognition.’”38
 Lieutenant-General Sir Brian 
Horrocks, Britain’s most successful 
and respected corps commander, was 
attached to First Canadian Army for 
Operation Veritable in the Rhineland 
and came to respect Crerar during the 
fighting.
[Crerar] was always very well-
informed because, in spite of the 
bad weather, he made constant 
flights over the battlefield in 
a small observation aircraft…I 
found myself getting very tired 
and irritable. But Crerar bore with 
me patiently.39
…Crerar… has always been much 
underrated, largely because he was 
the exact opposite to Montgomery. 
He hated publicity, but was full 
of common sense and always 
prepared to listen to the views of 
his subordinate commanders.40 
Horrocks was equally complimentary 
about the extensive Canadian 
build-up and deception plan for 
the operation.41 Horrocks was not 
the only one to notice. Eisenhower 
offered praise that Crerar had 
commanded the largest force ever 
grouped under a Canadian general: 
“It speaks volumes for your skill 
and determination.”42 Terry Copp 
commented that while Crerar was 
not close to operations, in his role 
as army commander “he managed 
a highly effective staff that proved 
capable of meeting the most difficult 
challenges.”43 British officers posted 
to Crerar headquarters after D Day 
came to recognize that Crerar’s 
staff “were an outstanding group of 
men who could hold their own with 
any army HQ under Eisenhower’s 
command.” 44 We can perhaps 
presume that after six months in 
operations Crerar had settled down 
to the business of running an army. 
 Canadian biographies and 
memoirs  present  a  di f ferent , 
perhaps more personality driven, 
view. Dominick Graham, Simond’s 
biographer, wrote that during the 
opening phases of the fall 1944 
Scheldt campaign “Crerar had shown 
no initiative. A plodding man who 
had not been given a positive order 
his response to Montgomery’s call to 
mask the lesser ports and get on with 
the Scheldt was not dynamic.”45 
 Major-General George Kitching, 
who had been a senior staff officer 
and divisional commander under 
Simonds, called Crerar a kind but 
uninspiring commander, who in 
1943 and early 1944 had become 
increasingly jealous of the younger 
Simonds.46 Kitching suggests that 
this jealousy had begun even earlier 
when in 1942 Simonds, then a staff 
officer, was the “brain” behind 
Crerar’s success in England.47 Despite 
this criticism Kitching reports that 
Crerar was “kindness itself” when 
offering moral support after Kitching 
had been sacked in July 1944 by 
Simonds.48 Similarly, Crerar used 
a “considered” approach when 
replacing Major-General Dan Spry 
as head of 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division. Simonds insisted that Spry 
be replaced after poor performance in 
the Hochwald. Crerar, as he had done 
in other cases, orchestrated the move 
so that it would achieve the desired 
effect with minimum impact on the 
man.49 In selecting the new GOC of 
5th Canadian Armoured Division in 
early 1944, Crerar listened to what 
others had to say and amended 
his choice, selecting Brigadier B.M. 
Hoffmeister. Then, in announcing the 
job to Hoffmeister he met the man at 
a set of map coordinates, shook hands 
and sat down for a chat. This does not 
represent a standoffish leadership 
style.50 From these examples it can be 
seen that Crerar was ready to reward 
and replace. That he did so in a careful 
and quiet way, compared to the 
more sensational Montgomery and 
Simonds, “obscured his willingness” 
to do so.51 
 By the end of 1944 Crerar had 
returned from a bout of dysentery 
and was in charge of an army that 
had grown to close to half a million 
men with several British and allied 
divisions under his command. 
Crerar was well suited for the task: 
“Few commanders were as qualified 
to handle an operation of such 
complexity – and precariousness.”52 
Indeed, as the battle began to go 
wrong Crerar was obliged to make 
a decision about whether he would 
throw support behind Horrocks 
should Simonds not achieve the 
anticipated advance. This has been 
described as a “threat” to Simonds,53 
but clearly Crerar was stating the 
obvious. He had two axes of advance 
within his sector and if one failed 
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he would logical ly 
reinforce the other. 
Ultimately he would 
place Simonds in the van 
in an assault through 
the Hochwald.54
 P a u l  D i c k s o n ’ s 
P h D  t h e s i s  o n 
Crerar, “The Limits 
of Professionalism,” 
offers some additional 
perspect ives . 55 For 
e x a m p l e ,  C r e r a r ’ s 
lack of operational 
activity and apparent 
attention to paperwork 
while commanding 
1  Canadian  Corps 
briefly in Italy can 
be  explained,  says 
Dickson, first because 
the corps was not in the 
line for most of the time 
Crerar was in command 
and also by the fact 
that Crerar had a new 
brigadier-general staff 
and was thus forced 
to take on more of the 
day to day coordination 
of corps activities than 
he might  normally 
have done.56 Dickson 
reports how Crerar matured as a 
corps commander shaping his staff 
by juggling between giving them 
some leeway and lecturing them 
in something of a teacher-student 
manner. 57 Crerar’s  suggestion 
that Italian operations bore some 
resemblance to Great War conditions 
was misinterpreted by those ignorant 
of the mobile operations conducted in 
the closing stages of that war. “Crerar 
was not attempting to force thinking 
towards rigid trench warfare, but 
towards the flexible but coordinated 
strengths of [1918 mobile] doctrine.”58 
Crerar went on to use similar tactics 
in the Rhineland battle, employing 
counter battery techniques based 
on proven tactics from 1917-18, 
and also instituting “pepper-pot” 
artillery concentrations which he 
had developed in Italy and which 
Dickson has not found used by other 
armies.59 Dickson concludes that 
while at 1 Canadian Corps Crerar 
“steadily immersed himself in the 
practice of command…To his credit, 
he proved to be flexible and open to 
new ideas. The inclusive nature of 
his professionalism was evident as he 
absorbed and implemented training 
policy and operational developments 
throughout the Corps.”60 
 Crerar may have been criticized 
but he did seem successful in staff 
and line appointments. Did he 
have intellect? Apparently so, if we 
accept that he was a key player in 
defence policy formulation and if 
we acknowledge that he learned 
enough on the battlefield to gain 
the respect of Sir Brian 
Horrocks. These same 
examples would also 
appear to demonstrate 
a  c o m p e t e n c y  o f 
warfighting and of 
the military-political 
interface. Did he meet 
t h e  c h a l l e n g e s  o f 
leadership? He quietly 
got on with selecting, 
developing, and, where 
necessary, replacing his 
subordinates. Did he 
pass the British opinion 
test? Both Montgomery 
and Brooke appear 
to have found him 
adequate. If not, why 
did he keep his job 
during Normandy and 
go on to command 
nearly half a million 
men in the Rhineland?
 In  reaching this 
conclusion we must 
base our assessment 
on only the barest 
witness of Crerar’s 
actual performance. 
What did he do during 
the Rhineland battles? 
We know that he made 
daily flights over the battlefield 
and that he commanded the largest 
army ever put under the control of 
a Canadian general. Paul Dickson’s 
work has begun to give us detailed 
insight into the man and his actions, 
but there are many questions which 
remain, and which need to be 
answered if we are to obtain a precise 
understanding of Harry Crerar’s 
apparent success.
 Guy Simonds was the third and 
last to have command, if temporarily, 
of First Canadian Army. An acting 
major when war broke out he 
advanced at an amazing rate to take 
command of 2 Canadian Corps in 
January 1944. Later that year, and 
again in the spring of 1945, he would 
replace Crerar when the latter fell ill.
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds briefly commanded First Canadian Army 
during the fall of 1944 when Crerar required hospitalization.
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 Despite these accomplishments, 
Simonds had both command and 
leadership problems in Sicily while 
leading 1st Canadian Division. Even 
George Kitching, Simonds’ GSO 1, 
feet that his boss made some tactical 
errors. Simonds’ performance in Sicily 
has been described as that of a young 
general who was innovative and 
daring, but overly rigid in sticking to 
a plan that might not be working.61 He 
would develop a plan himself without 
input from staff or subordinate 
COs before issuing orders. This 
would have had a negative impact 
on morale. By comparison many 
British commanders within Eighth 
Army were less formal and more 
collaborative.62 Admittedly, Simonds 
was under considerable stress: this 
was his first time in command in 
battle, with Canadian and British 
seniors watching and testing him.63 
 From Normandy to the Rhineland 
Simonds led both corps and army. 
In doing so he has been described 
as “tough, young, smart ruthless 
and intolerant of inefficiency.”64 
Early on, to solve the problems of 
cracking through the Germans south 
of Caen, his “fertile mind conjured 
up a hat full of tricks, many of them 
untried.”65 In the Scheldt campaign, 
he is again credited with a brilliant 
solution, which he had to push 
forward with determination until 
his seniors accepted it.66 Dickson, 
though a proponent of Crerar, 
concludes, that Simonds did well 
in replacing his superior: “by most 
accounts, Simonds’ assumption of 
command reinvigorated the army 
HQ; where Crerar managed, Simonds 
commanded.”67 
 English believes that Simonds’ 
policy directives “reflected originality, 
c l a r i t y  a n d  c o m p l e t e n e s s . ” 6 8 
Similarly, Copp says “Simonds was 
an innovative leader who approached 
each operation in a problem solving 
mode.” The general “did not hesitate 
to modify…doctrine and improvise 
new methods.” 69 While not free from 
failures, Simonds was very capable 
in exploiting the strengths of the 
fighting arms, but, says English, he 
did have to use a directive approach 
when working with less capable 
subordinate commanders. One 
could conclude that Simonds was 
forced into a command style that 
was skewed towards autocracy by 
presence of subordinates who were 
in need of being led.
 Terry Copp’s The Brigade gives 
us a balanced view of the young 
Canadian citing the general’s own 
chief of staff, Brigadier N.E. Roger, 
who appreciated Simonds’ ability 
to reduce a problem to the essential, 
establish a “clear-cut objective” and 
issue direction in “simple and direct 
terms.”70 On the other hand, Simonds 
seemed to possess “overwhelming 
self-confidence and a degree of 
arrogance which did not encourage 
expressions of dissent. Simonds did 
not attempt to lead; he sought only to 
command.”71 On the matter of errors 
during Operation Spring, Copp feels 
that Simonds acted properly based 
on the fragmentary information 
he had available: “He was wrong 
but this was not an unreasonable 
decision.”72 Moreover, Copp says 
that while Simonds’ Operation 
Spring was a failure the general 
took the hard lessons from it and 
applied them effectively in Operation 
Totalize. This “demonstrate[d] that 
Simonds could learn and grow as a 
corps commander.”73 Looking at a 
tough and inflexible reinforcement 
reception programme, intended 
to minimize immediate casualties 
among new soldiers, Copp records 
an empathetic Simonds: “I fully 
appreciate…that Commanding 
Officers have had little time to think 
about things other than the battle in 
which they are engaged.”74 
 Both Horrocks and Montgomery 
spoke highly of Simonds. Montgomery 
recorded: “The Canadian Army 
produced only one general fit to 
hold high command in the Second 
World War - Guy Simonds.”75 To read 
just this statement would suggest, 
perhaps, that Monty found no fault 
with the young Canadian, but this 
was not the case. Having earlier 
overturned Simonds’ decision to 
sack a brigadier in Italy, Montgomery 
wrote: “Simmonds [sic] is a young 
and very inexperienced Divisional 
general and has much to learn about 
command.”76 Later, in France and 
Germany, Horrocks found him to be 
a “first-class commander with a most 
original brain and full of initiative.”77 
 Canadian biographies and 
memoirs carry two themes: innovative 
and hard driving commander; cold 
and uninspiring leader. Major-
General Harry Foster’s comments are 
indicative.
He had that amazing ability of 
being able to analyze any given 
situation swiftly and accurately, 
cutting through irrelevancies to 
the heart of the problem, then 
making up his mind. His orders 
were always clear, concise – 
straight to the point. But he was a 
hard man to work for.
The performance standards 
and expectations he set for his 
subordinate commanders were so 
high it was impossible to satisfy 
him. …I tried to talk to him 
privately as a friend about the way 
he ran roughshod over one of my 
own brigadiers and a regimental 
commander. He seemed genuinely 
surprised. “Somebody had to 
speak to them, Harry. I did it 
because you didn’t.”78
 Indeed, Simonds was not even 
above sacking his protégé George 
Kitching when the latter proved 
incapable of running 4th Armoured 
Division in Normandy.79 Despite 
this Kitching remained a believer in 
Simonds, calling him “a first-class 
commander” who reached “the top 
rank” amongst his peers. Kitching 
took pains to point out Simonds’ 
7
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reservation and shyness, often seen as 
aloofness while in fact friends knew 
him to be “warm and generous.”80 
Perhaps these traits influenced him to 
keep on Major-General Rod Keller in 
Normandy; here he was not prepared 
to sack one of his subordinates 
despite the concerns of his seniors.81 
But more often Simonds rubbed 
the wrong way. Major-General Bert 
Hoffmeister, arguably Canada’s best 
division commander, did not enjoy 
working for Simonds. “[Hoffmeister] 
found Simonds rigid, fond of calling 
commanders back for direction, 
less likely to delegate responsibility 
to subordinate commanders and 
abrupt.” Personal relations between 
the two were “not good.” “Simonds 
used fear; Hoffmeister built teams.”82 
 In 1946 Simonds set down 
his own retrospective analysis of 
Operation Spring. He wrote with 
conviction that “non-observance of 
[a number of] tactical measures was 
in my opinion the cause of the failure 
… in operation ‘SPRING.’”83 His 
conclusion was cautious:
I would prefer to make no statement 
on the subject for I dislike even 
suggesting criticism of those who 
lost their lives, but if a statement 
is required from me as a matter of 
record, I consider that the losses were 
unnecessarily heavy and the results 
achieved disappointing. Such losses 
were not inherent in the plan nor in 
its intended execution.84
T h e  s o r t s  o f  “ p o l i c y  i n  t h e 
tactical handling of troops and 
in  adminis t ra t ion  genera l ly” 
that  S imonds wanted he had 
described personally to officers of 
3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 
2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade 
when those formations joined the 
Corps on 16 July 1944.85 While there 
is some discussion of tactical doctrine 
the tone of the address is akin to a 
By the criteria set out in this article, Crerar rates as Canada’s best senior commander. He got on well in and with Ottawa, had a firm 
understanding of the military profession, displayed an ability to manage large, complex organizations and battles and employed a 
command style that earned the respect of his fellow commanders. 
This photo shows the senior officers of First Canadian Army photographed at the end of the war. (l. to r. - seated) H.S. Maczek, G.G. 
Simonds, H.D.G. Crerar, C. Foulkes, B.M. Hoffmeister; (standing) R.H. Keefler, A.B. Matthews, H.W. Foster, R.W. Moncel, S.B. Rawlins. 
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commander giving his subordinates 
a refresher on what to expect. That 
Simonds took the time to have this 
sort of “chat” is an indication of the 
importance he placed on being a 
visible and proactive commander. 
Conversely, we see little humanity in 
Simonds in telling officers who had 
just come out of some hard fighting 
that he was prepared to incur up to 
70 per cent casualties if that meant 
winning a battle. Copp believes 
that this callous approach “must 
have met with a mixed reception,” 
particularly to men who were not 
new to Normandy, but new to 
Simonds’ corps.86
 How then should we measure 
Simonds’ success as a commander? It 
seems clear that he had a considerable 
intellect and that he applied it to 
well developed effect in the conduct 
of large scale military operations. 
His innovations, both technical 
and tactical, in France and Belgium 
remain examples of what generals are 
supposed to do: find ways to resolve 
battlefield impasses. Commander of 
the army on only two occasions and 
for limited periods he did not have to 
deal in any significant way with the 
Canadian government and thus we 
cannot make any conclusions about 
his success in this area. It is worth 
noting, however, that after the war he 
was not selected as CGS, apparently 
at Crerar’s suggestion.87 When he did 
assume that appointment in 1951 his 
tenure while of reasonable length was 
not smooth. 
 While Simonds was a brilliant 
master of the military art, he was 
less than perfect as a leader. His 
run-ins with subordinates, and 
superiors, suggest that he was not 
particularly comfortable in the sorts of 
interpersonal relationships required 
of high command. He knew what 
he was looking for in his followers, 
but got it more by direction and 
intimidation than by cooperation and 
collaboration. This may well have 
been a direct result of the relative 
inexperience of those over whom he 
was given command. His job, after 
all, was not to be popular but to help 
win the war while getting as many 
as possible of those for whom he was 
responsible back to Canada in one 
piece. 
 Was Simonds a successful 
commander? Yes, but perhaps only 
in the circumstances. As Terry Copp 
concludes, “Simonds lacked the 
human touch that distinguishes 
great leaders, but no other corps 
commander displayed such technical 
competence and flexibility.”88
 Two questions were asked at the 
beginning of this article: was it right 
to apply a three facetted measure 
of success when assessing senior 
military commanders; and, if yes, 
which of the three army commanders 
had been the most successful? 
 I t  seems  c lear  that  Andy 
McNaughton – while a man of great 
intellect and personal popularity – 
was not suited either to command 
(and manage) a large and complex 
field army, or to be that army’s 
spokesman when dealing with the 
national government in Ottawa. 
 Guy Simonds was never faced, in 
a protracted way, with that political 
challenge, although when his time 
came in the 1950s he experienced 
mixed success. As a battlefield 
manager he was the best Canada 
produced and was apparently as 
good as any the British could field. As 
one charged with the development 
of an effective working relationship 
with his subordinates he seemed able 
to direct with cold precision, but was 
generally unable or unwilling to lead 
with a human touch. He was not a 
failed commander, but he was less 
than ideal.
 This leaves Harry Crerar who 
got on well in and with Ottawa, had 
a firm understanding of the military 
profession, displayed an ability to 
manage large complex organizations 
and battles and employed a command 
style that earned the respect of 
Horrocks, the pre-eminent British 
corps commander. Least known of 
our three generals Crerar seems, 
nonetheless, to have been the most 
effective of the three commanders 
when our criteria for success are 
applied. 
 Terry Copp and others remind us 
that battle breaks down into a series 
of small unique combats.89 If, then, 
soldiers do not fight for their nation 
or regiment, but rather for those with 
whom they serve, is it not reasonable 
to modify this model to suggest 
that commanders do not command 
their armies directly, but rather they 
influence and direct a small group 
of immediate subordinates through 
whom the commander’s intent is, 
hopefully, successfully transmitted. 
If this is so, then surely it leaves us 
with important questions for the 
accurate measurement of command 
effectiveness and a commander’s 
success. We are a long way from a 
complete picture of success in high 
command.
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